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Lost at Sea
By Daniela Caruso*

A. Introduction
This essay aims to expand the definitional contours of the “lost generation” discussed in this
special section of the German Law Journal. A reflection on the existential loss experienced by
many young Europeans must also acknowledge, for the record and for reasons of relative
salience, those who have literally drowned in the waters of southern Europe in their quest for a
better future. Their youth has been lost in a true – not just metaphorical or metaphysical – sense.
The per-day death toll reached its peak on 3 October 2013, when over three hundred bodies were
retrieved off the coast of Lampedusa by Maltese and Italian rescue forces.1 The just-concluded
summer brought another tragic surge in Mediterranean migration, including more deadly
shipwrecks.2
The law of the European Union (EU) colors only a part of the backdrop against which these
deaths have occurred. Others share the responsibility. On one hand, member states’
immigration policies and nationality laws remain in large part un-harmonized. On the other
hand, international law regulates, among other things, the threshold of rescue obligations.
Nonetheless, the EU project itself is related to these deaths in many ways – both legal and
political – and cannot disown them.
A second goal of this contribution is to rethink, for a moment, the relation between the obstacles
that third country nationals (TNCs) encounter at the EU’s external frontiers and the increasing
permeability of internal borders. Normally one thinks of the two as structurally opposed. Within
its boundaries the EU dismantles checkpoints and fosters the bonding of its citizens. But
precisely in order to enable the communal experience of the EU’s insiders, Europe has reinforced
its external borders, digging an ever deeper chasm between the European “self” and the TNC
“other”. There are, indeed, plenty of EU activities that match exactly this dichotomous pattern.3
*
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See Frances Webber, The cradle or the grave? EU migration policy and human rights, 23 STATE WATCH J. 3, 4
(2014) (providing details of the tragedy).
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Migrants drown as Libya boat to Italy sinks, BBC NEWS (May 12, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe27379493; Tidal Wave, THE ECONOMIST, July 5, 2014; Nuova tragedia a Lampedusa. Affonda gommone, diciotto
morti, IL CORRIERE DELLA SERA, August 24, 2014.
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See Daniel Thym, EU Migration Policy and Its Constitutional Rationale: A Cosmopolitan Outlook, 50 COMMON
MKT L. REV. 709 (2013) (“Europe’s mission of promoting transnational freedom is not replicated in the Area of
Freedom, Security and Justice. Instead of dismantling borders, EU activities re-confirm the relevance of borders
towards third States[.]”
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Against this background, and by way of a thought experiment, this essay suspends the usual
conceptual frame, and proposes to characterize the internal and external EU attitudes as aligned
and even chronologically parallel. With Lampedusa as an illustration,4 these pages posit that a
link exists between the lost at sea and the particular juridical discourse that has characterized the
EU’s response to the Euro-zone crisis. This discourse, enshrined in primary and secondary
legislation as well as judicial opinions, has managed to lock in, bless, and codify a principled
resistance to sharing finite resources.
The dominant mantra of these years has been the non-renounceable independence of states’
budgets. No matter how deeply intertwined by the flow of people, things, and money, the
economies of member states have remained distinct, in their own “silos”. The no-bailout clause
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) has been crucial to the
unfolding of the Euro-zone crisis.5 Like a watershed, it has allowed the EU, as a supranational
legal system, to detach itself both morally and materially from the collapse of local economies.
By the same token, the most difficult aspect of migration – the flow of persons who have no
access to preauthorized channels – has been handled in such a way as to leave states ultimately
in charge and individually responsible. Of course, given the unity of external borders, there has
been a great deal of EU-level coordination to prevent and combat illegal immigration, as well as
significant harmonization of asylum laws.6 Nevertheless, no agile EU law mechanism exists to
weave those who make it ashore into the socio-economic fabric of the Union as a whole. To the
contrary, a complex set of rules and incentives often confines these persons to the state of first
entry for a long time.7 The material costs of short and medium term reception are shared only
minimally.8 Border states pay the consequences of poor EU policing measures on the EU
border.
4

By focusing on the subset of migrants that reach the coast of Lampedusa by means of make-shift boats, this essay
excludes from its scope visa-based or otherwise pre-authorized immigration. It is meant to reflect on short and
medium term reception policies, as opposed to the possibilities for inclusion that open up for some TCNs in the long
term. See e.g. Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals
who are long-term residents; and Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family
reunification.
5

See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Function of the European Union art. 125, 26 October 2012, 2012
O.J. (C 326) 47 [hereinafter “TFEU”].
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See TFEU art. 79, paras. 1 & 2(c), and Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16
December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country
nationals.
7

See FRANCESCA STRUMIA, SUPRANATIONAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CHALLENGE OF DIVERSITY 105 (2013),
highlighting the fact that EU law promotes the internal mobility of citizens but at the same time ‘immobilizes’
migrants. Notably, even if granted refugee status, immigrants must often remain in the state of first entry if they care
to obtain long-term residence permits.
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See infra, Section C. Minimum standards of reception have recently been specified in greater detail. See Directive
2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception
of applicants for international protection, OJ 2013 L 180, p. 96.
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Within this discourse, both the shipwrecks and the troubles of those who survive them can
somehow be archived as unfortunate byproducts of an otherwise normal, and necessary, exercise
in boundary drawing. The plight of Sicilian mayors, even when heard in Rome, finds no
sympathetic ear in Brussels. The EU system has already exhausted all plausible avenues for
redistribution within the constraints of the law. As a result, local problems are confined to their
geography. In what counts as ordinary parlance in post-crisis Europe, the fate of those in transit
to our shores can be downgraded from scandal to technical error, and from systemic problem to
peripheral glitch. There is, perhaps, a more than tenuous nexus between the particular mode of
the Euro-zone crisis management and the EU public’s habituation to an inherently antiredistributive discourse in matters of irregular migration across the Mediterranean.
To be sure, in many other corners of EU law the interdependence of states’ finances is the norm.
Since the days of Gravier, for instance, it has been clear the benefit of state-funded vocational
education must be extended, at no additional cost, to students from other member states.9
Furthermore, in cases like Viking and Laval, the Court of Justice has had no trouble imposing
redistributive obligations on workers of some states to the alleged benefit of workers from other
states, with immediate consequences for national welfare policies.10 The topic of migrants’
reception, by contrast, has been grafted onto a pattern of ultimate fiscal independence – a pattern
most obvious in the law of monetary union, and also visible in certain rules of EU citizenship.11
The reasons for this choice, often self-evident, run deep into the fabric of both history and
contemporary politics. Its wisdom, however, remains questionable, and must be questioned.
B. The Commonality of Discourse in EMU and Immigration Law
EU asylum and immigration rules have developed in a way that bears interesting analogies to
early monetary law and recent Euro-zone reforms. Just as in the case of monetary union, the
creation of supranational institutions for the management of immigration began as a response to
business’s antipathy for internal borders. The Sarrebruck Accord of 1984 between France and
Germany – a precursor to the larger agreement reached in Schengen in 1985 – was a political
response to a demonstration of truck drivers, angered by the length of checks at the FrancoGerman border.12
The genealogic parallel continues. The plan to communitarize monetary policy, building on the
provisions on monetary capacity of the Single European Act, was launched into reality with a
decision of the European Council in December 1991 and soon thereafter enshrined in the
9

Case 293/83 Gravier v. City of Liege, 1985 E.C.R. 593.
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See Alexander Somek, From Workers to Migrants: Exploring the Changing Social-Democratic Imagination, 18
EUR. L. J. 711 (2012).
11

Case C-86/12 Alopka v. Ministre du Travail, de l’Emploi et de l’Immigration, 2013 E.C.R. (not yet reported).

12

BARBARA MARSHALL, THE NEW GERMANY AND MIGRATION IN EUROPE 119 (2000).

Maastricht Treaty. It was with Maastricht, as well, that immigration policy began to move past
domestic confines.13 The reform had to work around a number of intergovernmental premises –
most importantly states’ exclusive grip on nationality laws, steeped in highly specific
experiences of colonialism, imperialism, and migration. Under the aegis of a new pillar, the
Schengen Agreement and Convention14 evolved into a Borders Code for the Union.15 The 1990
Dublin Convention16 morphed into the Dublin System.17 Thanks to a stronger foundation in the
Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU finally equipped itself with Frontex, a supranational agency set up
in Warsaw to manage and police external borders.18 Notably, the Treaty of Amsterdam also gave
prominent status to the idea of variable geometry – a concept and set of instruments essential to
the realization of both shared immigration policies and the EMU.
Analogies abound not only in the origins of current mechanisms, but also in the respective roles
played by various member states in their onset and operation. In the 1980s, before reunification,
Germany already experienced a high rate of inbound migration. It was in German political
circles that the idea of Europeanizing immigration policies was born. An explicit reason for this
shift to the supranational plane was the need to externalize a German problem. The goal was to
redirect some migratory flows to other EU states.19
Today, accounts of German virtue, so central to the politics of the Euro-zone crisis, are also
common in the literature on the Europeanization of mixed migration policy. Indeed, according to
the UNHCR, in 2013 Germany was the recipient of the largest number of asylum applications in
the region.20 The villains of the story of reception are found, instead, among the PIIGS. In 2011,
as the interest rates on Greek bonds took to the sky, the European Court of Human Rights
famously held that Greece had subjected an Afghani migrant to inhuman and degrading
13

Bruno de Witte, Institutional Variation across Policy Fields in the Evolution of European Union Law, 20
MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 465, 467-468 (2013).

14

Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the
Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of
checks at their common borders (19 June 1990), OJ 2000 L 239, p. 19.

15

Regulation (EC) 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a
Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code).

16

Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member
States of the European Communities (15 June 1990), OJ 1997 C254/1.

17

The pillars of the Dublin System were, and still are (in revised form), Council Regulation 343/2003 of 18
February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for
examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national [Dublin
Regulation], and Council Regulation 2725/2000 of 11 December 2000 concerning the establishment of 'Eurodac' for
the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Convention) [Eurodac].
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Council Regulation 2007/2004 establishing the European Agency for the Management of Operational
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union [Frontex].
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See MARSHALL, supra note __, at 119.

2014 UNHCR regional operations profile - Northern, Western, Central and Southern Europe, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e48e5f6.

treatment.21 Thus Greece, already the portrait of laziness and dishonesty in some quarters,22
became also the epitome of European xenophobia. Italy fared no better in 2012, when the
Strasbourg court condemned its unceremonious refoulement of intercepted migrants back to
Libya.23
When the crisis hit, the EMU system notoriously burst at the seams. The straight jacket of the
Treaty made urgent measures to save the Euro impossible. Any real strategy of survival had to be
at least partly outsourced to non-EU institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, or
nested in the interstices of the system. Creatively, Euro-experts devised a number of ad-hoc
solutions, ranging from conditional loans, austerity pledges and haircuts to new supervisory
bodies and banking rules, but emphatically not including Eurobonds or direct forms of financial
risk pooling. The Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) decision of 2012, allowing the
European Central Bank (ECB) to purchase sovereign bonds on the secondary market, was the
closest the system got to shoring up the finances of one state with the strength of the whole Eurozone. Notably, in reaction to the redistributive flavor of the OMT decision, the German Federal
Constitutional Court took pains to clarify the boundaries the ECB is not allowed to cross.24
Over the same time span, a surge in migration to the southern and eastern flanks of Europe
required similarly creative efforts.25 Frontex was not adequately present in the Mediterranean.
The national governments of the EU’s south were proving particularly ill-equipped to police the
influx of asylum seekers from Africa and the middle east – and in light of the sovereign debt
crisis, things could only get worse. Moreover, with the unfolding of the Arab Spring, these
governments found it ever more difficult to enforce repatriation treaties with non-EU countries.26
The EU therefore again rethought its immigration policy. Building on the legacies of Tampere
21

Eur. Court H.R., M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Judgment of 21 Jan. 2011, Reports of Judgments and Decisions
2011.

22

See Philomila Tsoukala, Narratives of the European Crisis and the Future of (Social) Europe, 48 TEXAS INT’L
L.J. 241-266 (2013) (analyzing, and critiquing, the common depiction of Greece as a profligate and immoral country
in the context of the Euro-zone crisis).
23

Eur. Court H.R., Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, Judgment of 23 February 2012, Reports of Judgments and
Decisions 2012 (Hirsi).

24

Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2728/13, para.41 (Jan. 14,
2014),
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/decisions/rs20140114_2bvr272813en.html
(“[F]iscal
redistribution [is] not entailed in the integration programme of the European Treaties. On the contrary, independence
of the national budgets, which opposes the direct or indirect common liability of the Member States for government
debts, is constituent for the design of the monetary union[.]”). See Dagmar Schiek, The German Federal
Constitutional Court’s Ruling on Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) – Another Step towards National
Closure?, 15 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL (2014).

25

Commission Communication examining the creation of a European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur),
COM(2008) 68 final of 13 February 2008.

26

Italy, for instance, was no longer able to enforce its bilateral agreements with Lybia, concerning prevention of
clandestine immigration, following the Lybian revolution which broke out in of 2011. See Hirsi, supra note __, at
para. 19-21.

and the Hague,27 in 2009 the European Council developed the Stockholm Programme, which
emphasized enhanced cooperation in border management, the importance of an EU external
security strategy, and strengthened cooperation with non-EU countries.28 While the Stockholm
Action Plan identified solidarity among member states as essential in the present migratory
context, its implementation largely consisted in reinforcing existing mechanisms, all based on
states’ individual responsibility in border management and in handling mixed migration flows.29
To be sure, two significant forms of EU resource pooling have stemmed from the Stockholm
strategy. One is the recent establishment of Eurosur30 – a coordinated system of high-tech border
surveillance that allows for real-time exchange of operational information among the member
states as well as between them and Frontex. The point of this initiative is to “reduce the number
of irregular migrants entering the EU undetected.”31 The other example of cooperation has been
the attempt to deepen the member states’ common relations with the EU’s neighbors. This is
known as the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP).32 It includes, among its recent yields, a
couple of “mobility partnerships,” and aims to lighten migratory pressure at the southern flanks
of Europe.33 Yet, even these EU-level initiatives remain anchored to the paradigm of states’
individual responsibility.
Eurosur, like many instruments of economic policy, is mostly a tool for coordination of member
states’ actions, not a wholesome assumption of the substantive task of policing irregular
immigration. In a statement attached to the Eurosur Regulation, the Council of Ministers
carefully dispels any belief to the contrary.34 Italy, for instance, must shoulder its own policing

27

PEO HANSEN & SANDY BRIAN HAGER, THE POLITICS OF EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP 162-164 (2010) (comparing the
Tampere Program of 1999 and the Hague Programme of 2004).

28

The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizens, 2 December 2009,
OJ 2010 C 115/1. See also Communication on delivering an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice for Europe's
citizens: Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme, COM(2010) 171 final of 20 April 2010 [Stockholm
Action Plan].

29

The Stockholm Program yielded two revised regulations (Dublin III and Eurodac) and two revised directives
(Conditions of Reception and Asylum Procedures) on 26 June 2013 (OJ 2013 L 180), and also the revised
Qualification Directive of 13 December 2011 (OJ 2011 L 337).

30

Regulation 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 establishing the
European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur).

31

Council adopts regulation establishing the EUROSUR system, Brussels, 22 October 2013, 15031/13 (OR. en)
Presse 426.

32

Joint Staff Working Document, Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2013. Regional report:
A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean Partners, available at
http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/2014/regional/pdsp_en.pdf,

33
34

See the EU mobility partnership agreements signed with Morocco (June 2013) and Tunisia (March 2014).

“Eurosur will contribute to improving the protection and the saving of lives of migrants. The Council recalls that
search and rescue at sea is a competence of the Member States which they exercise in the framework of international
conventions.” http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2013.295.01.0011.01.ENG.

operation, relying on spontaneous aid from other member states.35 This operation – known as
“Mare Nostrum” (our sea!) – has proven so taxing that it casts doubts on the value of
maintaining barriers to immigration.36 And, of course, the alphabet soup of reception centers in
Italy (CIE, SPRAR, CARA) is put together with national and international funds, not with direct
EU contributions.
The mobility partnership agreements, by the same token, only aim at the numerical reduction of
undocumented migrants, and do so in ways that do not align with the international rights of
asylum seekers.37 The ENP, within which the mobility partnerships are framed, aims to
strengthen democracy in the neighborhood so as to decrease the future flow of Europe-bound
migration. By design, it contributes nothing to the fortunes of those TNCs who cannot be pushed
back due to member states’ international obligations. These persons remain where they first
landed, waiting for their legal status to be determined by the relevant state authorities. Even if
not detained, they are locked into a system that worsens their prospects if they leave the state of
first arrival. They are “immobile migrants”38– a local problem by definition.
If a state does not manage to keep its borders clean it becomes, in EU law, the polluter that must
naturally pay, or – in Euro-crisis parlance – the one to blame for Europe’s loss of status in the
eyes of the world. Thus it becomes normal for border-states to pour whatever money is available
into coastal policing, leaving as little as necessary for immigrants’ reception and inclusion
efforts. Gate keeping, like austerity in the PIIGS zone, acquires an aura of necessity, crowding
out the economic and political space for alternative social strategies.
C. Solidarity vs. Redistribution
Besides emphasizing states’ responsibility to treat asylum seekers according to EU approved
standards, the EU Commission makes the case for “increased solidarity … among EU States, and
between the EU and non-EU countries.”39
The notion of solidarity, as enshrined in 19th century catholic social thought, is meant to bind the
faithful, but only in foro conscientiae. Interestingly, in its early formulation, solidarity did not
involve an enforceable legal duty to contribute one’s resources to common causes, and was in
35

Giovanni Caprara, L’Operazione Mare Nostrum, EURASIA, 4 November 2013, http://www.eurasiarivista.org/loperazione-mare-nostrum/20335/ (noting that assistance has come from Finland first, and then France
and the Netherlands).
36

Gianandrea Gaiani, Mare Nostrum, una nave da guerra da mezzo miliardo per i soccorsi, IL SOLE 24 ORE, 7 June
2014,
http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2014-06-07/mare-nostrum-nave-guerra-mezzo-miliardo-i-soccorsi101032.shtml?uuid=ABXMFoOB&fromSearch.
37

Tunisia-EU Mobility Partnership: A Forced March towards the Externalization
http://www.euromedrights.org/eng/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/PR_Tunisia_17-03_EN.pdf.

38
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STRUMIA, supra note __, at 105.
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/index_en.htm (emphasis added).
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fact at odds with any open redistributive command. In Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical of 1891,
solidarity was only one of the guiding principles.40 The document also featured subsidiarity,
which in the EU works as a bulwark against communitarization, and private property, which
stands in tension with redistribution.
In the context of EU immigration law and policy—as well as the policies aimed at resolving the
banking and sovereign debt crises—solidarity seems equally confined to the realm of voluntary
sharing. The bulk of the EU’s contribution to the handling of irregular migration inflows consists
of facilitating spontaneous solidarity gestures among member states. It is in this frame that the
EU has devised such programs as the European Resettlement Network,41 the Temporary
Protection Directive (in the wake of the Kosovo crisis),42 and Eurema (a pilot project of intra-EU
relocation intended to provide relief to Malta).43 As the Council of Europe remarks, “[b]oth
resettlement and relocation depend entirely on the good will and voluntary participation of the
receiving States.”44
When it comes to receiving and including irregular migrants into the EU society – an essential
component of today’s broader ‘social question’—redistribution is structurally difficult.45 There
are, of course, some truly redistributive inclusion programs, consisting not just of coordination
mechanisms but of EU funds, duly earmarked in the budget and weighing on member states’
finances in proportion to their fortunes. 46 But as in the case of the European Refugee Fund, such
efforts remain materially and systemically marginal.

40

Rerum Novarum, 15 May 1891: LEONIS XIII P. M. ACTA, XI, 97 (1892).

41

See most recently the joint IOM, UNHCR and ICMC project entitled ‘Strengthening the response to emergency
resettlement needs,’ available at http://www.resettlement.eu/page/emergency-resettlement-project.
42

Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the
event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States
in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof. Chapter VI of this directive, under the heading
‘Solidarity,’ contemplated the possibility for Member states to volunteer as receivers in the event of a mass influx of
displaced persons. This would imply that immigrants would not be confined to the port of first entry. However, as
the DG Home Affairs states on its website, the provisions within this Directive have not been triggered so far.
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/temporary-protection/index_en.htm

43

EUREMA I and II, Pilot Project for Intra-EU re-allocation from Malta (since 2009).

44

Council of Europe, Report of Parliamentary, Resettlement of refugees, towards greater solidarity, Doc. 13460, 21
March
2014,
para.
17,
available
at
http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewPDF.asp?FileID=20564&Language=en.
45

Floris De Witte, EU Law, Politics, and the Social Question, 14 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 581, 588 (2013)
(“Answers to the social question that presuppose different, or more stringent regulatory or redistributive
commitments, are structurally less likely to be implemented successfully in Europe.”).
46

Council Decision 2000/596/EC of 28 September 2000 establishing a European Refugee Fund, OJ 2000 L/252/12
(subsequently renewed). See also Council Decision of 25 June 2007 establishing the European Fund for the
Integration of third country nationals for the period 2007 to 2013 as part of the General programme Solidarity and
Management of Migration Flows (2007/435/EC).

In a different political climate, one could aspire to transform the current system into one that
embraces irregular migration as a natural, timeless phenomenon, to be owned fully at EU level
so as to take seriously both the rights and the moral claims of the excluded. To begin with, one
could conceive of not just minimum reception standards, but also fully coordinated –and
binding—relocation schemes, as well as paths towards legal employment that direct recently
documented immigrants towards those corners of Europe where unemployment rates are
relatively less dire and the welfare system relatively less burdened. Even within the current legal
architecture, the EU could make room for “mutual recognition of belonging,” i.e. for the idea
that those who have duly obtained permits in one state be immediately allowed to move across
internal borders with no loss of status or resident seniority.47
But at present there is no sign of convergence on such goals. Urgent humanitarian measures,
while legally possible and definitely not radical, are proving hard to trigger. The recast Dublin
Regulation has indeed cast again, with only cosmetic alteration, the principle that asylum
applications must be filed in the country of first entry – a feature of the system that creates undue
pressure on southern member states, fills up their reception centers, and toughens the stance of
coastal patrols.48 Even with the leeway of the ordinary legislative procedure, upon which the
recasting exercise was based, the EU legislature has kept the Dublin silos separate.49 In a climate
that is structurally hostile to the mutualization of reception burdens, it is difficult to summon
political consensus towards gate lifting. Concerted efforts have therefore remained oriented
towards Eurosur’s drones and Eurodac’s fingerprinting. The rest is left to good will.
Over time, the lines that separate areas of shared obligation from zones of local concern acquire
an aura of eternal wisdom and inevitability. These lines are of course the arbitrary result of
historical accidents and political bargains. They have been, however, written into law, and now
determine with apparent objectivity the most entangled questions of our time.50
D. A Way Forward
Pushing for EU-level redistribution in matters of irregular migration reception might very well
be sheer folly in the current post-election climate. Things can always get worse, and often do.
Redistribution often implies fuller integration. And if deeper federalism (as per Mr. Juncker’s
program) were to combine with nationalist sentiment (as per Mme. Le Pen’s emboldened vision),
one might soon look back with nostalgia at the days in which spontaneous solidarity was at least
an option. It is, in any case, beyond the ambition of this essay to chart the course of future
47

STRUMIA, supra note __, at 291-300.

48

Regulation 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and
mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection
lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast), OJ 2013 L180/31.

49
50

TFEU art. 78(2)(e).

Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Legal Argument, 3 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE ACADEMY OF EUROPEAN LAW
1992 II 309 (1994).

immigration reforms or the path of budgetary and social-welfare integration. What the foregoing
sections have, more modestly, attempted to produce is a map of a pervasive discourse that
normalizes tragedy and localizes problems, even when, for structural reasons, solutions at the
local level are simply non-existent.
In opposition to this discourse, which the experience of the Euro-zone crisis has somehow
fortified, it is today particularly important to rethink the lines we have drawn between matters of
common budgetary concern and states’ exclusive worries. When these lines are revisited, the
arbitrariness of current resource silos – both within the EU and in Europe’s dealings with its
neighbors – may become easier to detect. An essential part of this reflection depends on
building narratives of openness and continuity between Europe and the lands whence desperate
migration journeys originate. This much can certainly be done in the forum of public opinion, as
well as in the realm of academic work.
History, as always, lends much needed perspective, and may help us situate the burning question
of migrants’ inclusion in a larger and deeper context. As recently pointed out, the coming to life
of the European Communities (EC) was no virgin birth,51 and the past sins of member states in
what we now call the global south would cast long shadows on the novel supranational
enterprise.52 Archival research has recently unearthed important details on the EC’s role in
(post)colonial affairs. This work duly revisits the traditional understanding of the early
Community ethos, and even posits that the goal of managing colonial affairs was as central to
post-WWII federalism as the Iron Curtain problem.53 It has also been documented that during the
interwar period, Europe looked at Africa as a place that could and should welcome as many
migrants as necessary to cure Europe’s own demographic problems.54 Against this background,
the fact that “today’s EU does as it pleases to prevent African migrants from entering Europe”
acquires a darker tone.55
Even something as contemporary as the ENP has much to gain from historical inquiry. For
instance, the EU’s agreements with neighboring countries are often advertised as rescue
measures offered to ever-struggling economies around the Mediterranean. But with closer
analysis, one retrieves stories of once flourishing industries in the north of Africa, crushed by the
very market forces that the Common Market unleashed and nurtured.56 It is as well essential to
51
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carry such insights to the present world trade context, and pay special attention to the negative
externalities of both internal commerce and external EU deals. The plight of irregular migrants at
Europe’s gate may then acquire higher salience.
As Europe reflects inwardly on its own struggles and its inner inequities, a redistributive concern
– the raw idea that past and present wrongs call for redressing – must remain firmly at the center
of the debate. Historicized and contextualized redistributive arguments may prove more useful
than identity politics;57 more convincing than liberal egalitarianism;58 more prescriptive than
cosmopolitan outlooks;59 and perhaps more apt to question, in the long term, the stonewalling
practice that insulates Brussels from Lampedusa’s mourning.
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